151 ideas
13773 | For the truth you need Prodicus's fifty-drachma course, not his one-drachma course [Socrates] |
343 | The unexamined life is not worth living for men [Socrates] |
7421 | A philosopher is one who cares about what other people care about [Socrates, by Foucault] |
1649 | Socrates opened philosophy to all, but Plato confined moral enquiry to a tiny elite [Vlastos on Socrates] |
5842 | Philosophical discussion involves dividing subject-matter into categories [Socrates, by Xenophon] |
648 | Socrates began the quest for something universal with his definitions, but he didn't make them separate [Socrates, by Aristotle] |
11832 | We learn a concept's relations by using it, without reducing it to anything [Wiggins] |
16512 | Semantic facts are preferable to transcendental philosophical fiction [Wiggins] |
164 | It is legitimate to play the devil's advocate [Socrates] |
1647 | In Socratic dialogue you must say what you believe, so unasserted premises are not debated [Vlastos on Socrates] |
115 | Socrates was pleased if his mistakes were proved wrong [Socrates] |
22099 | The method of Socrates shows the student is discovering the truth within himself [Socrates, by Carlisle] |
5844 | Socrates always proceeded in argument by general agreement at each stage [Socrates, by Xenophon] |
11389 | Socrates sought essences, which are the basis of formal logic [Socrates, by Aristotle] |
639 | Socrates developed definitions as the basis of syllogisms, and also inductive arguments [Socrates, by Aristotle] |
11863 | (λx)[Man x] means 'the property x has iff x is a man'. [Wiggins] |
17529 | Maybe the concept needed under which things coincide must also yield a principle of counting [Wiggins] |
17530 | The sortal needed for identities may not always be sufficient to support counting [Wiggins] |
14746 | What exists can't depend on our conceptual scheme, and using all conceptual schemes is too liberal [Sider on Wiggins] |
16523 | Realist Conceptualists accept that our interests affect our concepts [Wiggins] |
16524 | Conceptualism says we must use our individuating concepts to grasp reality [Wiggins] |
16526 | Animal classifications: the Emperor's, fabulous, innumerable, like flies, stray dogs, embalmed…. [Wiggins] |
12056 | An ancestral relation is either direct or transitively indirect [Wiggins] |
12050 | Substances contain a source of change or principle of activity [Wiggins] |
1652 | Socrates did not consider universals or definitions as having separate existence, but Plato made Forms of them [Socrates, by Aristotle] |
16492 | Individuation needs accounts of identity, of change, and of singling out [Wiggins] |
16493 | Individuation can only be understood by the relation between things and thinkers [Wiggins] |
11900 | We can accept criteria of distinctness and persistence, without making the counterfactual claims [Mackie,P on Wiggins] |
11870 | Activity individuates natural things, functions do artefacts, and intentions do artworks [Wiggins] |
16496 | Singling out extends back and forward in time [Wiggins] |
11866 | The idea of 'thisness' is better expressed with designation/predication and particular/universal [Wiggins] |
13128 | 'Ultimate sortals' cannot explain ontological categories [Westerhoff on Wiggins] |
16495 | The only singling out is singling out 'as' something [Wiggins] |
16501 | In Aristotle's sense, saying x falls under f is to say what x is [Wiggins] |
16506 | Every determinate thing falls under a sortal, which fixes its persistence [Wiggins] |
12055 | Sortal predications are answers to the question 'what is x?' [Wiggins] |
12059 | A river may change constantly, but not in respect of being a river [Wiggins] |
12052 | We never single out just 'this', but always 'this something-or-other' [Wiggins] |
12063 | Sortal classification becomes science, with cross reference clarifying individuals [Wiggins] |
12051 | If the kinds are divided realistically, they fall into substances [Wiggins] |
12053 | 'Human being' is a better answer to 'what is it?' than 'poet', as the latter comes in degrees [Wiggins] |
12054 | Secondary substances correctly divide primary substances by activity-principles and relations [Wiggins] |
11896 | A sortal essence is a thing's principle of individuation [Wiggins, by Mackie,P] |
15835 | Wiggins's sortal essentialism rests on a thing's principle of individuation [Wiggins, by Mackie,P] |
11841 | The evening star is the same planet but not the same star as the morning star, since it is not a star [Wiggins] |
10679 | 'Sortalism' says parts only compose a whole if it falls under a sort or kind [Wiggins, by Hossack] |
14363 | Identity a=b is only possible with some concept to give persistence and existence conditions [Wiggins, by Strawson,P] |
14364 | A thing is necessarily its highest sortal kind, which entails an essential constitution [Wiggins, by Strawson,P] |
11851 | Many predicates are purely generic, or pure determiners, rather than sortals [Wiggins] |
11865 | The possibility of a property needs an essential sortal concept to conceive it [Wiggins] |
12047 | We refer to persisting substances, in perception and in thought, and they aid understanding [Wiggins] |
14744 | Objects can only coincide if they are of different kinds; trees can't coincide with other trees [Wiggins, by Sider] |
11852 | Is the Pope's crown one crown, if it is made of many crowns? [Wiggins] |
11875 | Boundaries are not crucial to mountains, so they are determinate without a determinate extent [Wiggins] |
12057 | Matter underlies things, composes things, and brings them to be [Wiggins] |
14749 | Identity is an atemporal relation, but composition is relative to times [Wiggins, by Sider] |
11844 | If I destroy an item, I do not destroy each part of it [Wiggins] |
11861 | We can forget about individual or particularized essences [Wiggins] |
16509 | Natural kinds are well suited to be the sortals which fix substances [Wiggins] |
11871 | Essences are not explanations, but individuations [Wiggins] |
11879 | Essentialism is best represented as a predicate-modifier: □(a exists → a is F) [Wiggins, by Mackie,P] |
16514 | Artefacts are individuated by some matter having a certain function [Wiggins] |
16510 | Nominal essences don't fix membership, ignore evolution, and aren't contextual [Wiggins] |
11835 | The nominal essence is the idea behind a name used for sorting [Wiggins] |
16503 | 'What is it?' gives the kind, nature, persistence conditions and identity over time of a thing [Wiggins] |
11876 | It is easier to go from horses to horse-stages than from horse-stages to horses [Wiggins] |
16499 | A restored church is the same 'church', but not the same 'building' or 'brickwork' [Wiggins] |
16515 | A thing begins only once; for a clock, it is when its making is first completed [Wiggins] |
16517 | Priests prefer the working ship; antiquarians prefer the reconstruction [Wiggins] |
11858 | The question is not what gets the title 'Theseus' Ship', but what is identical with the original [Wiggins] |
11843 | Identity over a time and at a time aren't different concepts [Wiggins] |
11864 | Hesperus=Hesperus, and Phosphorus=Hesperus, so necessarily Phosphorus=Hesperus [Wiggins] |
16502 | Identity is primitive [Wiggins] |
16498 | Identity cannot be defined, because definitions are identities [Wiggins] |
16497 | Leibniz's Law (not transitivity, symmetry, reflexivity) marks what is peculiar to identity [Wiggins] |
11831 | The formal properties of identity are reflexivity and Leibniz's Law [Wiggins] |
14362 | Relative Identity is incompatible with the Indiscernibility of Identicals [Wiggins, by Strawson,P] |
11838 | Relativity of Identity makes identity entirely depend on a category [Wiggins] |
11847 | To identify two items, we must have a common sort for them [Wiggins] |
16521 | A is necessarily A, so if B is A, then B is also necessarily A [Wiggins] |
16505 | By the principle of Indiscernibility, a symmetrical object could only be half of itself! [Wiggins] |
11839 | Do both 'same f as' and '=' support Leibniz's Law? [Wiggins] |
11845 | Substitutivity, and hence most reasoning, needs Leibniz's Law [Wiggins] |
16494 | We want to explain sameness as coincidence of substance, not as anything qualitative [Wiggins] |
16522 | It is hard or impossible to think of Caesar as not human [Wiggins] |
11869 | Possible worlds rest on the objects about which we have suppositions [Wiggins] |
11850 | Not every story corresponds to a possible world [Wiggins] |
16525 | Our sortal concepts fix what we find in experience [Wiggins] |
12064 | The category of substance is more important for epistemology than for ontology [Wiggins] |
12049 | Naming the secondary substance provides a mass of general information [Wiggins] |
11848 | Asking 'what is it?' nicely points us to the persistence of a continuing entity [Wiggins] |
12065 | Seeing a group of soldiers as an army is irresistible, in ontology and explanation [Wiggins] |
1650 | For Socrates our soul, though hard to define, is our self [Vlastos on Socrates] |
23252 | Socrates first proposed that we are run by mind or reason [Socrates, by Frede,M] |
11859 | The mind conceptualizes objects; yet objects impinge upon the mind [Wiggins] |
16518 | We conceptualise objects, but they impinge on us [Wiggins] |
11836 | We can use 'concept' for the reference, and 'conception' for sense [Wiggins] |
16511 | A 'conception' of a horse is a full theory of what it is (and not just the 'concept') [Wiggins] |
22858 | There is collective action, where a trend is manifest, but is not attributable to individuals [Lukes] |
5843 | People do what they think they should do, and only ever do what they think they should do [Socrates, by Xenophon] |
5253 | Socrates was shocked by the idea of akrasia, but observation shows that it happens [Aristotle on Socrates] |
1653 | Socrates did not accept the tripartite soul (which permits akrasia) [Vlastos on Socrates] |
199 | The common belief is that people can know the best without acting on it [Socrates] |
195 | No one willingly commits an evil or base act [Socrates] |
5839 | For Socrates, wisdom and prudence were the same thing [Socrates, by Xenophon] |
5867 | For Socrates, virtues are forms of knowledge, so knowing justice produces justice [Socrates, by Aristotle] |
5069 | Socrates was the first to base ethics upon reason, and use reason to explain it [Taylor,R on Socrates] |
5836 | All human virtues are increased by study and practice [Socrates, by Xenophon] |
5840 | The wise perform good actions, and people fail to be good without wisdom [Socrates, by Xenophon] |
185 | Socrates despised good looks [Socrates, by Plato] |
5070 | Socrates conservatively assumed that Athenian conventions were natural and true [Taylor,R on Socrates] |
5838 | A well-made dung basket is fine, and a badly-made gold shield is base, because of function [Socrates, by Xenophon] |
339 | Men fear death as a great evil when it may be a great blessing [Socrates] |
344 | If death is like a night of dreamless sleep, such nights are very pleasant [Socrates] |
5837 | Things are both good and fine by the same standard [Socrates, by Xenophon] |
3017 | The only good is knowledge, and the only evil is ignorance [Socrates, by Diog. Laertius] |
1646 | Socrates was the first to put 'eudaimonia' at the centre of ethics [Socrates, by Vlastos] |
2 | We should not even harm someone who harms us [Socrates] |
1663 | By 'areté' Socrates means just what we mean by moral virtue [Vlastos on Socrates] |
345 | A good man cannot be harmed, either in life or in death [Socrates] |
4323 | Socrates is torn between intellectual virtue, which is united and teachable, and natural virtue, which isn't [PG on Socrates] |
8003 | Socrates agrees that virtue is teachable, but then denies that there are teachers [Socrates, by MacIntyre] |
126 | We should ask what sort of people we want to be [Socrates] |
4111 | Socrates believed that basically there is only one virtue, the power of right judgement [Socrates, by Williams,B] |
7808 | Socrates made the civic values of justice and friendship paramount [Socrates, by Grayling] |
346 | One ought not to return a wrong or injury to any person, whatever the provocation [Socrates] |
23907 | Courage is scientific knowledge [Socrates, by Aristotle] |
341 | Wealth is good if it is accompanied by virtue [Socrates] |
7585 | Socrates emphasises that the knower is an existing individual, with existence his main task [Socrates, by Kierkegaard] |
22854 | Power is a capacity, which may never need to be exercised [Lukes] |
22850 | Hidden powers are the most effective [Lukes] |
22852 | The pluralist view says that power is restrained by group rivalry [Lukes] |
22855 | One-dimensionsal power is behaviour in observable conflicts of interests [Lukes] |
22856 | Political organisation brings some conflicts to the fore, and suppresses others [Lukes] |
22857 | The two-dimensional view of power recognises the importance of controlling the agenda [Lukes] |
22859 | Power can be exercised to determine a person's desires [Lukes] |
22863 | Power is the capacity of a social class to realise its interests [Lukes] |
22860 | The evidence for the exertion of power need not involve a grievance of the powerless [Lukes] |
22861 | Power is affecting a person in a way contrary to their interests [Lukes] |
21133 | Supreme power is getting people to have thoughts and desires chosen by you [Lukes] |
22851 | In the 1950s they said ideology is finished, and expertise takes over [Lukes] |
22862 | Liberals take people as they are, and take their preferences to be their interests [Lukes] |
5841 | Obedience to the law gives the best life, and success in war [Socrates, by Xenophon] |
22853 | Anyone who thinks capitalism can improve their lives is endorsing capitalism [Lukes] |
347 | Will I stand up against the law, simply because I have been unjustly judged? [Socrates] |
1661 | Socrates was the first to grasp that a cruelty is not justified by another cruelty [Vlastos on Socrates] |
5846 | A lover using force is a villain, but a seducer is much worse, because he corrupts character [Socrates, by Xenophon] |
11860 | Lawlike propensities are enough to individuate natural kinds [Wiggins] |
1657 | Socrates holds that right reason entails virtue, and this must also apply to the gods [Vlastos on Socrates] |
1662 | A new concept of God as unswerving goodness emerges from Socrates' commitment to virtue [Vlastos on Socrates] |
338 | Socrates is accused of denying the gods, saying sun is stone and moon is earth [Socrates, by Plato] |